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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Andres Alvarez appeals following the district court’s revocation of his probation
and the district court’s denial of his motion for credit for time served.

On appeal,

Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court erred when it calculated his credit for time
served. The 2015 amendments to the credit statutes, which are retroactive, require the
district court to give Mr. Alvarez credit for all the time served as a condition of his
probation. Mr. Alvarez also asserts that the district court erred in revoking his probation.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Alvarez’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State took the position that the 2015 amendments
to the statutes were not in effect on the date the district court entered its first order
revoking probation, and, because the statutes are not retroactive, they did not apply to
the district court’s calculation of credit for time served. (Resp. Br., pp.4-7.) The State
ignores the fact that the district court, after entering the initial order revoking probation,
considered the issue again pursuant to Mr. Alvarez’s motion for credit for time served,
and a nunc pro tunc1 order revoking probation was filed on July 1, 2015, the same day
the amendments went into effect, and an order denying Mr. Alvarez’s motion for credit
for time served was filed on July 2, 2015, two days after the statutory amendments were

1

The nunc pro tunc order dated back to the March 26, 2015 order revoking probation.
1

effective. This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contention that credit for
time served calculation may only be performed at the time probation is initially revoked.

2

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Alvarez credit for time he served as a
condition of probation?

2.

Did the district court err in revoking Mr. Alvarez’s probation?2

Mr. Alvarez fully briefed the sentencing issue in his Appellant’s Brief and will rely on
the briefing of this issue therein.

2
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Alvarez Credit For Time He Served As A
Condition Of Probation
Mr. Alvarez asserts that the district court erred when it denied him credit for time
he served as a condition of probation. On March 26, 2015, the district court revoked
Mr. Alvarez’s probation. (Supp. R., pp.54-57.) On May 26, 2015, Mr. Alvarez filed a pro
se Motion for Credit for Time Served and supporting affidavit in which he asserted that
he should have received credit for all of the time he served in conjunction with the
charge and the resulting sentence imposed by the Court. (Supp. R., pp.63-67.) The
district court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part on July 2, 2015.
(Order Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served, attached to Motion to Augment, p.1,
filed October 23, 2015.) The district court acknowledged that the law governing credit
for time served as a condition of probation had been amended and noted that
Mr. Alvarez had served 60 days as a condition of probation, but refused to credit
Mr. Alvarez for the time.3 (Order Denying Motion for Credit for Time Served, attached to
Motion to Augment, pp.3-4, filed October 23, 2015.) Although the district court also
issued a corrected order revoking probation which gave Mr. Alvarez credit for 226 days
served, the district court’s award of credit specifically excepted from its re-calculation
the 60 days Mr. Alvarez served as a condition of probation. (Corrected Order Revoking
Probation, Imposing Sentence and Commitment, p.3, attached to the Motion to
Augment filed on October 23, 2015.)

Although the district court found Mr. Alvarez had served 60 days as a condition of his
probation, there is evidence in the record that Mr. Alvarez was approved for 10 days of
good time credit. (R., p.145.)

3
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The amendments to both of the credit statutes became effective on July 1, 2015.
See 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99 (H.B. 64).

Because the effective date of the

amendments was on or before the date the district court’s orders calculating credit for
time served were filed, the district court erred in refusing to give Mr. Alvarez credit for
time served as a condition of probation.
The State classifies Mr. Alvarez’s motion for credit for time served as a “motion
for reconsideration” but this is wholly inaccurate. (Resp. Brief, p.5 n.5.) The pro se
motion was entitled “Motion for Credit for Time Served,” and it was brought under I.C.R.
35(c). (Supp. R., pp.63-64.)
The Idaho Criminal Rules specifically provide that a defendant may file a motion
to correct the calculation of credit at any time, thus the time the judgment is entered or
executed is not a factor to be considered in performing a credit calculation. I.C.R. 35(c).
Further, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has recently made clear, “the language of I.C. §
18-309 is mandatory and requires that, in sentencing a criminal defendant or (as in this
case) when hearing an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, the court give the
appropriate credit . . . .” State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014). “This
means that the defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent incarcerated,” as defined
by the statute.4 Id. Thus, the focus of the credit statutes is not on the judgment itself,
but rather, on the defendant—the person against whom that judgment was entered.
See also I.C. § 18-309(2) (“[i]n computing the time of imprisonment when . . . [the]
sentence has been suspended and is later imposed, the person against whom the

While the defendant in Moore was seeking credit for prejudgment incarceration, and
Mr. Alvarez is seeking credit for time served as a condition of probation, the reasoning
of Moore applies equally to all periods of incarceration identified in the credit statutes.
4
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judgment is entered or imposed shall receive credit in the judgment . . . .”) (emphasis
added); I.C. § 19-2603 ([t]he defendant shall receive credit for time served . . . for any
time served as a condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended
sentence.”) (emphasis added).
The State also incorrectly emphasizes the phrase: “When the court finds that the
defendant has violated the terms of probation . . . .”

(Resp. Br., p.7 (emphasis in

original).) That particular provision of I.C. § 19-2603 addresses when the district court
is authorized to revoke probation: “When the court finds that the defendant has violated
the terms and conditions of probation, it may . . . revoke probation.” I.C. § 19-2603.
The provision about when the district court revokes probation does not impact on the
credit calculation, since the credit calculation is addressed in a different part of the
statute. As discussed above, that part of I.C. § 19-2603 provides, “[t]he defendant shall
receive credit . . . for any time served as a condition of probation under the withheld
judgment or suspended sentence.” I.C. § 19-2603. Ultimately, the State is applying a
tortured reading to the plain, unambiguous language of these statutes. The State is
attempting to change the meaning of the term “when” from its actual use in the context
of “in circumstances where” to repurpose the “when” to mean a deadline or time
requirement.

In other words the State is asking this Court to use the language

describing those instances in which the Court may revoke probation, to place a time
limitation on when credit may be calculated—an application which twists the plain
language of these statutes and which would require both an illogical result—one which
is certainly unsupported by case law—and an interpretation that directly controverts
I.C.R. 35(c).

The State’s tortured reading of these statutes is contradicted by the

6

language of I.C.R. 35(c) which allows such motions to be brought “at any time.” I.C.R.
35(c). Because a motion requesting credit for time served may be brought “at any time”
pursuant to I.C.R. 35(c), credit for time served can be calculated or re-calculated at any
time. I.C.R. 35(c).
Further, the Court is obligated to ensure the defendant is receiving “credit for the
correct amount of time actually served . . . . The [courts do] not have discretion to
award credit for time served that is either more or less than that.” See Moore, 156
Idaho at 21 (emphasis added). Therefore, the State’s argument—which is essentially
that this Court should affirm an improper calculation of credit due to the time at which
the judgment was entered or executed—is unavailing.
Here, the 2015 amendments to the credit statutes require the district court to give
Mr. Alvarez credit for all the time served as a condition of probation. The Amendments
to the two relevant statutes took effect on July 1, 2015. Where the district court issued
a corrected order revoking probation on July 1, 2015, and issued its order denying
Mr. Alvarez’s motion for credit for time served on July 2, 2015, the statutory language in
effect at the time the district court calculated the time Mr. Alvarez had served required
the district court to credit Mr. Alvarez with time served as a condition of probation.
Thus, the district court erred in denying his motion for credit for time served and in
refusing to award him credit for time served as a condition of probation.5

Mr. Alvarez incorporates by reference his alternative argument that the 2015
amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 were retroactive, but chooses not to repeat
that argument in his Reply Brief.
5
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Alvarez respectfully requests that this Court order that he be given credit for
all time he was incarcerated on this case, including the time served as a condition of
probation. Additionally, Mr. Alvarez asks this Court to place him back on probation.
DATED this 19th day of January, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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